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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JANET S. PEREZ,

:

Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING,
Respondent/Appellee.

:
:

Appellate Case No. 20050895-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR THIS APPEAL
This Court has jurisdiction of this petition for review pursuant to Section 78-2a3(2)(a), Utah Code, "final orders and decrees resultingfromformal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies...."
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. The central issue in mis case is whether the Final Agency Order incorrectly
concludes that a parcel of real property held by the Atticus Family Trust pursuant to an
Irrevocable Trust Agreement dated September 15, 1992 (hereafter sometimes "Trust" or
"Trust Agreement") is an asset of the petitioner, Janet S. Perez (hereafter "petitioner" or
"Mrs. Perez") which disqualifies Mrs. PerezfromMedicaid assistance on the grounds
that its value exceeds the Medicaid asset limit. The standard of review of this issue is
1

essentially a correction of error standard involving interpretation and construction of the
Irrevocable Trust Agreement, in light of Utah law, and the applicable Medicaid statutes
and regulations. Section 63-46b-16(4)(d), Utah Code; Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 811 P. 2d 664, 160 U. A. R. 5, (Utah, 1991); Utah Department of
Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P. 2d 601 (Utah, 1983). Cf
Bleazardv. Utah Department ofHealth, 861 P. 2d 1048, 220 U A. R 33 (1993), "This
appeal requires us to construe federal and state statutes, regulations and rules governing
the Medicaid program. Thus, it presents questions of law and 'we accord no particular
deference to the agency decision... but review... for correctness.' Allen v. Department
ofHealth, 850 P. 2d 1267, 1269 (Utah 1993)." 861 P. 2d at 1049. Similarly,
interpretation of the Trust Agreement is essentially a question of law which is reviewed
for correctness, no deference being given to the finder of fact. Fairbourn Commercial,
Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, 94 P. 3d 292,^6.
The following specific issues are significant to determination of the central issue
described above:
A. Whether the Final Agency Order incorrectly concludes that Mrs. Perez
is a "beneficiary" of the entire corpus of the Trust on the basis of the general definition of
"beneficiary" found at Section 75-7-103, Utah Code, rather than the terms of the Trust
Agreement itself, which limits any interest of Mrs. Perez to an undisputedly valueless
lifetime use right. The standard of review is identical to that set forth for issue one
above.
2

B. Whether the Final Agency Order incorrectly fails to find that any
interest of Mrs. Perez in the trust property is a valueless lifetime use right, based on the
evidence presented at hearing. This issue is reviewed on a substantial evidence standard,
Section 63-46b-16(4)(g), Utah Code, however, there is no evidence in the record
disputing Mrs. Perez' evidence regarding value. The hearing officer did not reach this
question of fact due to his interpretation of the Trust Agreement.
C. Whether the Final Agency Order incorrectly concludes that all trust
property not specifically gifted to the named beneficiaries constitutes Mrs. Perez9
"separate estate," rather than trust corpus which the successor trustees may distribute only
according to the terms of the trust, which terms do not include any power to distribute to
Mrs. Perez. The standard of review for this issue is identical to that set forth for issue
one above.
D. Whether the Final Agency Order incorrectly concludes that the
successor trustees have succeeded to Mrs. Perez' reserved power to alter the beneficial
interest under the Trust Agreement. The standard of review for this issue is identical to
that set forth for issue one above.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
42 U. S. C. 1396a(k):
(1) In the case of a medicaid qualifying trust (described in paragraph (2)), the
amountsfromthe trust deemed available to a grantor... is the maximum
amount of payments that may be permitted under the terms of the trust to be
distributed to the grantor, assuming the full exercise of discretion by the trustee
or trustees for the distribution of the maximum amount to the grantor. For
3

purposes of the previous sentence, the term "grantor" means the individual
referred to in paragraph (2).
(2) For purposes of this subsection, a "medicaid qualifying trust" is a trust, or
similar legal device, established (other than by will) by an individual... under
which the individual may be the beneficiary of all or part of the payments from
the trust and the distribution of such payments is determined by one or more
trustees who are permitted to exercise any discretion with respect to the
distribution to the individual.
(3) This subsection shall apply without regard to(A) Whether or not the medicaid qualifying trust is irrevocable or is
established for purposes other than to enable the grantor to qualify for medical
assistance under this subchapter; or
(B) Whether or not the discretion described in paragraph (2) is actually
exercised.
Section 75-5-503, Utah Code:
"A power of attorney may not be construed to grant authority to an
attorney-in-fact or agent to perform any of the following, unless expressly
authorized in the power of attorney:
(1) create, modify, or revoke an inter vivos revocable trust created
by the principal...."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case
This is a petition for review of a Final Agency Order of the Utah Department of
Health, Division of Health Care Financing (hereafter sometimes the "Department of
Health"), based on a recommended decision by hearing officer, Douglas Jensen, denying
Mrs. Perez medicaid benefits based on imputation to her of the value of a tract of land
^tuated in Kane County, Utah, owned by the Atticus Family Trust pursuant to a
4

September 15, 1992 Irrevocable Trust Agreement
2. Course of Proceedings.
On October 12, 2004, the Department of Health issued a Notice of Decision to
Mrs. Perez denying her medicaid benefits on the grounds that her assets exceeded the
$2,000.00 Medicaid asset limit (R 5, 125). Mrs. Perez, through family, requested a
hearing on that denial. Ibid. On May 23, 2005, hearing convened (R 124). Following
hearing, the hearing officer issued a Recommended Decision, (R 124-133), which the
Department of Health adopted as its Final Agency Order (R 122). Mrs. Perez has
appealed to this court.
3. Agency Disposition
On September 2, 2005, the Department of Health issued a Final Agency Order
confirming their prior Notice of Decision denying Medicaid benefits to Mrs. Perez (R
122).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Mrs. Perez is 65 years old (R 71).
2. Since January 22, 2004, she has resided at the Kane County Skilled Nursing
Facility, where she suffers from meningioma (cancer of the covering of the brain) and
hydrocephalus (Ibid).
3. Mrs. Perez has an advance case of meningioma. Her son, Rob Perez, testified
that communication with Mrs. Perez is very difficult, sometimes she responds, other
times she stares blankly and is not responsive to any stimulus (Tr. 55). Mrs. Perez'
5

daughter, Rene Pace, testified that Mrs. Perez cannot get out of bed on her own, she
cannot feed herself, and she can't hold hands for lack of strength in her arms (Tr. 56).
Sometimes Mrs. Perez says to Rene that she loves her, but other times she just blankly
stares, even saying that she has not seen her daughter Rene when Rene is standing in
front of her (Tr. 56).
4. Mrs. Perez was first diagnosed with a brain tumor in 1977 (Tr 54). Surgery
followed that same year and Mrs. Perez recovered and was re-employed (Tr. 55).
5. Meningioma is a very slow moving condition (Ibid). It was not until
December, 2003 that Mrs. Perez began a very marked decline in her condition, going
from being able to get up on her own, feeding herself, and carrying on coherent
conversations to her present condition in the period of about one month (Tr. 57).
6. Today, Mrs. Perez is confused most of the time and unable to care for herself
outside of a stilled nursing facility (Tr. 86).
1. Mrs. Perez' physician, Dr. Jonathan Bowman states that Mrs. Perez "is
completely dependent on skilled nursing care for her daily needs. She is bed-bound most
of the day and is only able to be transferred to a wheelchair with a lift." (R 72).
8. Dr. Bowman concludes that Mrs. Perez "is confused most of the time and is
unable to make daily decisions due to her mental status. She would not be able to care
for herself outside of a skilled nursing facility" (Ibid).
9. On September 15, 1992, Mrs. Perez, with her sister, Roberta Jean Flournoy,
established the Atticus Family Trust by Irrevocable Trust Agreement of that date (R 31).
6

10. The Atticus Family Trust has no bank account and no cash assets of any
kind, its sole asset being a 50 acre tract of land in Kane County (R 55-57).
11. Rene Pace testified that this 50 acre tract of land is approximately two-thirds
gully or canyon with a creek running through it (Tr. 60). It is the same general area
where a local boy was killed when a canyon wall collapsed earlier in 2005 (Ibid).
12. The property is very sandy (Tr. 60). The portion of the property up out of
the canyon has large sink holes (Ibid).
13. The Trust Agreement has an unusual provision that "[i]n the event of erosion
of a beneficiary's Vi acre choice of land, rendering the land unsuitable for a homesite,"
the site "can be extended, provided only that said extended portion does not encroach on
another beneficiary's homesite selection, or a different site can be selected" (R. 37).
14. One of the selected homesites has a mobile home on it which is now
dangerously close to the canyon and which has been condemned by the building
inspectors (Tr. 61). No one lives there (Ibid).
15. In a period of about nine years, the area behind the condemned mobile home
has eroded 6-8 feet so that the small fence around the back of the mobile home is now on
the edge of the canyon (Tr. 64).
16. The travel trailer referred to in the Trust Agreement, Article IV(A)(2), was
removed four tofiveyears ago due to its condition (Tr. 64, 76).
17. There is no fence around the property and the property has a lot of sagebrush,
with no grassy areas (Tr. 60, 63). Rene Pace opined that a cow feeding there "would not
7

last very long" (Tr.77).
18. The eastern boundary of the property appears to follow the creek bottom but
there are no water rights with the property, and no rights to water cattlefromthe creek
(Tr. 65, 77).
19. None of the three witnesses supporting petitioner at the hearing could
conceive of any way in which a right to use the property for Mrs. Perez' lifetime could
have any marketable value (Tr. 79).
20. The witnesses for the Department of Health acknowledged that none of them
had ever looked at the property (Tr. 38).
21. Mrs. Perez' sister, Roberta Jean Flournoy, with whom Mrs. Perez
established the Atticus Family Trust, died in March approximately two years before the
hearing (Tr. 50).
22. The name Atticus Family Trust relates to family history and demonstrates an
intent to create a safe haven for the family (Tr. 67-69).
23.

The Department of Health denied benefits on the basis of Kane County's

assessment of the property which placed its value at $82,219.00 (R. 5, 96).
24. Petitioner here summarizes key provisions of the Trust Agreement:
A. By the Preamble and Article I of the Trust Agreement, petitioner, Janet
Pace Perez, as Trustor, establishes the Atticus Family Trust, with herself and her sister,
Roberta Jean Flournoy, as trustees and transferred to the Trust the property described
above. (R. 34, 55-57).
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B. By Article IV, Trustor "irrevocably gifts beneficial ownership in the
Trust to her children Rene' Elizabeth Pace Tulak and Roberta Thomas Perez, and her
niece and nephew, Jean Virginia Jiroudek, aka Jean V. Flournoy and Thomas Ronald
Jiroudek." (R 35).
C. By Article IV(A)(1), Trustor "reserves to her children and niece and
nephew named above for their exclusive use a minimum of lA acre each . . . to be used as
a homesite for each beneficiary, for such beneficiary's use...." (R. 35-36).
D. By Article IV(A)(2), "Trustees Janet Pace Perez [petitioner] and/or
Roberta Jean Flournoy shall be entitled to use and enjoyment of the property for their
lifetimes...." (R. 36).
E. By Article IV(A)(4), homesites can be adjusted in event of erosion. (R
37).
F. By Article IV(A)(7), "[t]he Trust may use the 'common9 land for
purposes of generating income," so long as certain conditions are met, including
sufficient income to support expenses, compliance with law, land preservation, and no
undue hardship on the beneficiaries." (R 37-38).
G. By Article IV(C), Trustor, "shall have the power to alter the terms of
the use or disposition of the property during her lifetime, provided that she may not
pledge the property for the benefit of her individual creditors, or change any homesite of
the beneficiaries after a homesite is selected and the beneficiary has made material
improvements to the homesite. Until then, the Trustor may modify the beneficial
9

interests regarding the homesite. Other than the homesite, the Trustor reserves the right
to change the beneficial interest as she may wish." (R 38).
H. By Article V(A), "[djuring the lifetime of the Trustor, the Trustee may
pay to the beneficiaries, in the discretion of the Trustee, the up-to-the net income of the
Trust Estate

" (R 38).
I. By Article V(B), "[i]f Trustor or any Beneficiary shall come under any

physical or mental disability, in addition to the net income of the Trustor's separate
estate, the Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of the Trustor so much of the
principal of the disabled Trustor's separate estate as the Trustee shall deem necessary for
the Trustor's proper support, health, and maintenance, to be paid out of all beneficiaries'
shares, as the case may be, provided that no payment shall be made where other means of
support are available, including insurance, or public assistance." (R 39).
J. By Article VI, "[u]pon the death of the Trustor, the Trustee shall
marshall the assets of the trust estate . . . and do the following:
"(1) Divide the Estate into four (4) equal shares of beneficial interest
[for the four beneficiaries]....
"(2) The surviving Co-Trustees may thereafter liquidate and
distribute the Trust to the beneficiaries [upon affirmative vote]... If not so liquidated
(partially or fully) the property shall continue to be held in trust with the property
administered for the benefit of the beneficiaries

" (R 40).

K. By Article IX(A), if "either Trustee resigns or is unable to act for any
10

reason, the following shall act as Successor Trustee, in the order named:
"1. The survivor of the initial Trustees.
"2. Robert Thomas Perez and Thomas Ronald Jiroudek as CoTrustees, with a majority of the beneficiaries as set forth in Article HI." (R 44).
L. By Article XI(K)(1), "If at any time the Trustee (or Successor Trustee,
as the case may be) shall receive a written statement signed by a Trustor's or Trustee's
personal physician (or a specialist approved by such personal physician, or any two other
licensed physicians) stating that he considers a Trustor or a Trustee to be so mentally or
physically incapacitated as to be substantially unable to manage his or her financial
resources and affairs effectively... such Trustor or Trustee shall be considered
incapacitated...." (R. 49).
M. By Article XI(K)(2), "[i]f a Trustor or Trustee is determined to be
incapacitated as provided above, then, during the period of such incapacity (a) if such
Trustor or Trustee is then acting as a trustee hereunder, he shall be deemed to have
resigned.... (c) the Trustee shall have power and authority on such incapacitated
Trustor's or Trustee's behalf to exercise or perform any act, power, duty, right or
obligation whatsoever that such Trustor or Trustee may have, relating to any person,
matter, transaction, or property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, whether in the
trust estate or owned by Trustor or Trustee including, without limitation, power to
transfer to himself as Trustee upon the terms set forth in this agreement any property
owned by Trustor or Trustee. The power granted under (c) above shall be construed and
11

interpreted as a general durable power of attorney to act as such Trustor's attorney in fact
and agent in his name and for his benefit and shall be in addition to all other powers
bestowed upon the Trustee by this agreement." (R. 50).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Nowhere in the Trust Agreement is there any provision granting to Mrs. Perez
anything other than the lifetime use right set forth in Article IV(A)(2). By Mrs. Perez'
undisputed hearing evidence, this lifetime use right is valueless, considering the nature
and limitations of the subject real property, which property is the only asset of the Trust.
By Article IV(A), Mrs. Perez "irrevocably gifts beneficial ownership in the Trust
to" four named beneficiaries. Mrs. Perez is not one of these. Upon the death of the Mrs.
Perez, her successor trustee(s) are to divide and distribute the trust estate among these
same four named beneficiaries. There simply is no basis for concluding, as the hearing
officer did, that Mrs. Perez is a beneficiary of the entire corpus of this irrevocable trust,
which ultimately vests in her surviving beneficiaries only after her death.
The Trustee(s) reserved power to invade principal of Mrs. Perez' "separate estate"
in Article V(B) reaches nothing which violates the Medicaid asset limit because the only
"separate estate" which can be identified anywhere is her undisputedly valueless lifetime
use right.
The Trustor's reserved power under Article IV(C), to alter the terms of the use or
disposition of the property during her lifetime cannot include the power to make herself a
beneficiary of the trust because she has already gifted, irrevocably, the beneficial interest
12

under the trust to the four named beneficiaries. In any case, this reserved power died
with Mrs. Perez' mind since, as a matter of law, a general power of attorney such as that
created by Article XI(K)(2), does not include an amendment power unless expressly
granted by empowering document.
ARGUMENT
Petitioner does not dispute application of 42 U. S. C. A. Section 1396a(k)(l),
relied on by the hearing officer, that in determining the medicaid asset limit the amount
deemed available to the petitioner is "the maximum amount of payments that may be
permitted under the terms of the trust to be distributed to the grantor, assuming full
exercise of discretion by the trustee or trustees for the distribution of the maximum
amount to the grantor." Petitioner submits, however, that only a strained and improbable
construction of the Trust, such as that created by the hearing officer, allows the trustees to
do anything which violates the Medicaid asset limit.
There is no clause in the Trust naming Mrs. Perez as a beneficiary of the Trust.
Article IV(A) identifies four beneficial interests and names four beneficiaries. Mrs.
Perez is not one of these. Article VI directs distribution of the trust assets to these same
four named beneficiaries on Mrs. Perez' death. Obviously, Mrs. Perez is not one of
these. No clause in the Trust identifies Mrs. Perez as one of the beneficiaries of the
Trust.
Article IV(A)(2) reserves to Mrs. Perez and her sister a "right to use and
enjoyment of the property for their lifetimes," but this is a far different rightfromthe full
13

beneficial interest in the trust corpus granted to the four named beneficiaries.
The hearing officer concluded that Mrs. Perez "is a beneficiary of the trust during
her lifetime because she has a present beneficial interest in 48 acres of the property" and
that further, "[a]s an incapacitated person, she is currently entitled to the net income and
principalfromthe trust." (R. 125).
The hearing officer justifies his conclusion by citation to Section 75-7-103, Utah
Code, that a "beneficiary" is a "person that (i) has a present orfixturebeneficial interest in
a trust, vested or contingent." Even if statutory definition is substituted for reasonable
trust construction to detennine that Mrs. Perez is a "beneficiary" of the Trust, the next
logical question must be what is the nature of Mrs. Perez' interest in the trust property?
It certainly cannot be the ultimate benefit of distribution from the Trust upon Mrs. Perez'
death since that is granted to four named individuals other than Mrs. Perez. It can only
be whatever interest is reserved by the terms of the trust to the Mrs. Perez. That interest
is a limited lifetime use right only, which obviously terminates at Mrs. Perez' death.
At hearing, Mrs. Perez presented extensive evidence that her lifetime right to use
the property is valueless. Mrs. Perez admits that the property has an assessed value on
the records of Kane County, but this value is necessarily based on conveyance of the fee
interest in the property to a third party—something which Mrs. Perez no longer do since
she conveyed the property instead to this irrevocable trust. The hearing officer made no
findings on this evidence. The only basis for not doing so is the improbable conclusion
that Mrs. Perez' interest in the trust property is identical to that of the four named
14

beneficiaries, which clearly is not the case.
InPerrenoud, etal, v. Harman, etal, 2000 UTApp241, 8 P. 3d293, this court
considered and stated certain rules of construction applicable to trusts, citing to and
quotingfromMakoffv. Makoff, 528 P. 2d 797 (Utah, 1974). First, '"The general rules
of construction of written instruments apply to the construction of trust instruments, and
those rules require a determination of the intention of the settlor where the creation of the
trust is a unilateral matter."9 Ibid, %13. If the trust is a written instrument, "the intention
of the settlor must be ascertained from the language thereof, and the court may not go
outside of the language in an effort to give effect to what it thinks the intent was." Ibid.
However, ascertaining the intention of the settlor does involve consideration of the
66

entire instrument aided by surrounding circumstances existing at the time of the creation

of the trust." Ibid.

Thus, in Perrenoud, the "'entire instrument9" was considered in

order to determine the effect of an addendum. Ibid.
Mrs. Perez submits that no reasonable and harmonious construction of the Trust
can conclude that Mrs. Perez9 interest in the trust property is equal to that of the named
beneficiaries. Repeatedly, the term "beneficiary" is used in the Trust in circumstances
which obviously do not include Mrs. Perez: Article III refers to a quorum of
"beneficiaries" after Mrs. Perez death. Article IV allows selection of one-half acre
homesites for each "beneficiary's use." Article IV(B) prohibits a "beneficiary" from
adding to the Trust but allows the initial trustees to do so. Article VI, dealing with
distribution after the death of Mrs. Perez, repeatedly uses the term "beneficiary" to refer
15

only to her survivors. Thus, while Mrs. Perez has a lifetime use right to the property, that
is all she has. She does not have a disqualifying beneficial interest in or to the corpus of
the Trust.
The hearing officer is correct that at the hearing there was "much discussion," (R
129), of the impact of Section V(B) of the Trust: "If Trustor or any Beneficiary shall
come under any physical or mental disability, in addition to the net income of the
Trustor's separate estate, the Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of the Trustor so
much of the principal of the disabled Trustor's separate estate as the Trustee shall deem
necessary for the Trustor's proper support, health, and maintenance, to be paid out of all
beneficiaries' shares, as the case may be, provided that no payment shall be made where
other means of support are available, including insurance, or public assistance."
[Emphasis supplied.]
The most obvious meaning of this clause is that Mrs. Perez may have accumulated,
by the time of her disability, a valuable estate separate and apartfromthis Trust. This
clause allows her successor trustees to pay disability related expenses of Mrs. Perez or
any beneficiary from Mrs. Perez' separate estate and property. In fact, Mrs. Perez has no
valuable separate property, so the clause simply has no application.
However, the Department of Health cited this clause in support of their claim that
the Trustees had a general power to pay Mrs. Perez' disability related expenses out of the
Trust (R. 115). For this reason, Mrs. Perez' case presentation at the hearing included
consideration of the potential benefits Mrs. Perez might have by reason of her lifetime
16

right to use the property, whichrightis arguably part of her "separate estate/' since it is
reserved to her by Article IV(A)(2). Mrs. Perez' evidence was unopposed by any
contrary evidencefromthe Department of Health. Mrs. Perez' evidence demonstrated
that, considering the nature and condition of the property, this lifetime userighthad no
value.
Incredibly, the hearing officer concluded that "the entire 48 acres of 'ungifted'
property remain the petitioner's 'separate estate,'" (R. 130). There simply is no sense to
this conclusion. Mrs. Perez placed the entire property irrevocably in trust, to be
administered according to the terms of the trust. Having done so, Mrs. Perez had no
estate or interest in the trust property except as reserved by the terms of the trust. To
conclude otherwise, as the hearing officer did, is to stand the entire law of trusts on its
head. It is tantamount to saying that this irrevocable conveyance in fact has no legal
significance-this trust property is still Mrs. Perez' separate property despite the Trust
Agreement. Clearly this conclusion cannot be sustained.
Petitioner does not dispute the conclusion of the hearing officer that "it is not until
the death of the petitioner that her children and niece and nephew are entitled to
ownership of any property beyond their previously selected Vi-acre sites as stated in
Article VI

" (R. 130). By the same token, it is also correct that the general trust

corpus is not the separate property of the petitioner. The property has been placed,
irrevocably, in trust. While there and until distribution following petitioner's death, it is
neither the separate property of the four named beneficiaries nor the separate property of
17

the petitioner. It is trust property to be administered by the trustees under the terms of the
trust. Unless this court is prepared to conclude, for some unknown reason, that this trust
has no legal significance whatsoever, this court cannot sustain the conclusion of the
hearing officer that the petitioner's "separate estate" extends beyond a limited lifetime
use right, which is undisputedly valueless.
The hearing officer's decision also mentions a reserved right in Petitioner to
amend the trust, which right is stated in Article IV(C) as follows: "Trustor shall have the
power to alter the terms of the use or disposition of the property during her lifetime,"
including the reserved right "to change the beneficial interest as she may wish." (R. 38,
128). However, it is beyond dispute that the petitioner lacks capacity to amend the trust.
Her physician has stated that since her admission to the Skilled Nursing Facility "she has
been neither physically nor mentally capable of managing her own financial affairs," (R.
71), and in the Recommended Decision below the petitioner is "acknowledged as
disabled." (R. 128). Nevertheless, the hearing officer concludes that the "successor
trustees now hold the authority to take any and all actions originally granted to the
petitioner as Trustor and original Trustee of the trust." (R 129).
It is incorrect to conclude that the successor trustees of the trust have the legal
ability to alter the terms of the trust so as to extend petitioner's interest in the trust
beyond her limited and valueless lifetime use right.

By the terms of Article XI(K)(2) of

the trust, the trustees have "(c) . . . power and authority... to perform any act, power,
duty, right or obligation whatsoever that such Trustor or Trustee may have . . . [which]
18

power granted to the Trustee under (c) above shall be construed and interpreted as a
general durable power ofattorney in fact and agent in his name and for his benefit . . . "
[Emphasis supplied.] (R. 50). Under Utah law, specifically Section 75-5-503, Utah
Code, a "power of attorney may not be construed to grant authority to an attorney-in-fact
or agent to . . . (1) create, modify, or revoke an inter vivos revocable trust created by the
principal...," unless such a power to amend is "expressly authorized in the power of
attorney." Therefore, the specter of creating an additional right or conferring an
additional benefit on petitioner which violates the Medicaid asset limit does not exist as
no power to amend is expressly named as a power which inures to the successor trustees.
While Section 75-5-503, Utah Code, specifically mentions "revocable" trusts, it's
underlying policy should be held to apply also to amendable, irrevocable trusts. The
reasons for the limitation on the holder of the power of attorney apply regardless of
whether the Trust is revocable or irrevocable: the holder of a mere power of attorney
should not have authority to alter a person's lifetime property dispositions. The
probability is that the drafters of Section 75-5-503 simply did not anticipate an
amendable irrevocable trust. Moreover, Section 75-5-503, Utah Code, simply restates
the law of agency as it applies to existing agreements: "The rule is quite universal that
the power to execute a contract or agreement does not grant authority to vary the
agreement after it has been executed, nor is the power to vary an agreement after
execution inferred from a general power to make it." Agency §85, 3 Am Jur 2d 488
(1962). Therefore, there is no power in any current trustee of the Trust to alter the Trust
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so as to grant to Mrs. Perez any beneficial interest in the Trust which would disqualify
herfromMedicaid benefits.
It bears asking that even if none of this were accurate, and Mrs. Perez were
competent to amend her trust, how would she do so to extend a benefit to herself beyond
the limited and valueless lifetime use right which she already has? She cannot take the
fee of the trust property back to herself because she has placed it already in trust,
irrevocably, and it makes no sense whatsoever for her to make herself a beneficiary of the
trust, since she would then take a beneficial interest in the fee of the trust property only
after her death. There simply is no realistic amendment scenario under which Mrs.
Perez' lifetime use right under the Trust can be enlarged so as to disqualify her from
Medicaid benefits.
Finally, at the hearing, there was argument that the Trust assets should be
considered disqualifying assets if for no reason other than that the Successor Trustees
might befriendlyto the Petitioner, do as they please, and allow distribution to the
Petitioner just because they wanted to do so, or just because everybody involved decided
to allow it to happen.
This kind of argument was considered and specifically rejected by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York in Verdow Ex Rel Meyer v.
Sutkowy, 209 F. R D, 309 (N. D. N. Y., 2002). Verdow involved a certified class action
in which the plaintiffs were elderly nursing home residents who had established
irrevocable trusts. In administering the Medicaid program, the State adopted a broad
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ranging "any circumstances" test for cfcsqualification-if there was any remote possibility
of benefit to these plaintiffs from their trusts, then the plaintiffs should be disqualified
from Medicaid benefits. Though the plaintiffs9 trusts were irrevocable, the terms of their
trusts allowed them to appoint or change beneficiaries, and New York law allowed for
revocation of any Trust, even an irrevocable one, if all beneficiaries consent. The State
argued that because the plaintiffs could alter their trusts to include beneficiaries who were
friendly to them and therefore amenable to revocation of their otherwise irrevocable
trusts, all trust assets should be considered available to the plaintiffs.
The District Court rejected this argument as "entirely speculative," 209 R R D. at
316, holding that "the decision of whether or not to provide Medicaid benefits should not
be based on the remote possibility of collusion," ibid, instead concluding as a matter of
law that despite the plaintiffs reserved powers to control who benefitted from their trusts
"there are no possible circumstances under which paymentfromthe corpus of the
irrevocable trusts could be made to or for the benefit of plaintiffs." Ibid.
In the present case, Mrs. Perez is entitled to the same treatment. The possibility
of other disposition based on remote possibilities or unwarranted speculation is not a
basis for imputation of trust assets to Mrs. Perez, as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The Final Agency Order should be reversed. Since no contrary evidence as to the
value of Mrs. Perez' lifetime use right was presented at hearing, there is no factual basis
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on which Mrs. Perez could be denied benefits on remand. The Department of Health
should be ordered to extend Medicaid benefits to Mrs. Perez.
Respectfully submitted this I /"ttay of January, 2006.

L. Edward Robbins
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
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RECONSIDERATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
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SIGNED IF YOU DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ASK FOR A
RECONSIDERATION FIRST, BUT YOU MAY DO SO IF YOU WISH IF YOU HAVE
QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 538-6576
The enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed puisuant to Section 63-465-12
Utah Code Ann 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review - Piocedure," and Department of
Health Administrative Rule R410 14, entitled "Division of Health Care Financing
Administrative Heanng Procedures foi Medicaid/UMAP Applicants, Recipients, and
Piovideis "
I hercb} adopt Recommended Decision No. 04-350-88 in its entirety.
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Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty
(30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency Action or, if a lequest for reconsideration is
filed and denied, within thirty (30) days of the denial for reconsideration The petition shall be
served upon the Director of Health Caie Financing and shall state the specific grounds upon
which review is sought Failure to file such a petition within the 30-day time limit may
constitute a waiver of any right to appeal the Final Agency Order
A cop> of this Final Agency Order shall be sent to Petitioner or representative at the last
known address by certified mail, return receipt requested
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BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
STATE OF UTAH
-00O00-

JANETS PEREZ
PETITIONER,
RECOMMENDED DECISION

vs

CASE NO. 04-350-88

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING,

Douglas Jensen
Hearing Officer

Respondent.

Pursuant to Rule R4I0-14 of the Utah Department of Health and the Utah Administtative
Pioceduies Act, Section 63-46b-l et seq , Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, a foimal
administrate e telephonic hcanng foi the above captioned case was held on Monday, May 23,
2005 The petitioner, a musing home resident, did not appear but was represented by L Edwaid
Robbins, attorncy-at-law. Present for the petitioner and presenting testimony were daughtei,
Rene Pace, son and attoincy-m-fact, Robert Perez, and nephew, Tom Jiroudek. The respondent
was represented by Jean Hendrickson, assistant attorney geneial, Elaine Jensen, case manager
with the Bureau of Eligibility Services (BES), and Sandra Woodbury, supervisor with BES.
ISSUE
DID THE MEDICAID AGENCY CORRECTLY DENY THE PETITIONER'S
APPLICATION BECAUSE THE ASSET CONTAINED WITHIN THE ATTICUS FAMILY
TRUST WAS AN AVAILABLE ASSET?

SJ

The petitioner, Janet Perez, entered the Kane County Nursing Home on January 22, 2004. An
application for Nursing Home (NH) Medicaid benefits was submitted in her behalf on
September 14, 2004. During the eligibility determination process, the Medicaid agency was
informed that the petitioner had created a trust in September 1992. The Medicaid agency
determined that the assets contained in that trust were available to the petitioner and further
determined that the value of the trust assets exceeded the $2,000.00 Medicaid asset limit. A
Notice of Decision was sent to the petitioner on October 12, 2004, informing her that the
Medicaid application had been denied due to excess assets. The petitioner (and/or those acting
for the petitioner) disagreed with the agency action and requested a hearing on December 13,
2004, seeking to dispute the denial.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The petitioner, Janet Perez, is a 65 year-old, widowed female. She entered the Kane
County Nursing Home on or around January 22, 2004, for long-term institutional care.
She continues to reside in that facility.

2.

The petitioner suffers from meningioma (cancer of the covering of the brain) and
hydrocephalus which has made her completely dependent on skilled nursing care for her
daily needs.

3.

The Atticus Family Trust (the trust) was cieated on September 15, 1992.

4.

A Quit-Claim Deed was completed on September 15, 1992, wherein Janet Pace Perez,
grantor, quit-claimed the property (described in Exhibit A of the trust) to the Atticus
Family Trust, Janet Pace Perez and Roberta Jean Flournoy trustees.

5.

The property transferred to the trust is 50 acres of land located outside or near Kanab,
Utah. A 2003 Kane County Notice of Property Valuation and Tax Charges valued the
ptoperty at $82,219.00 ($17,000.00 as Primary Improved Property and $65,219.00 as
Agricultural Land).

6.

The petitioner is a beneficiary of the trust during her lifetime because she has a present
beneficial interest in 48 acres of the property. As an incapacitated person, she is
currently entitled to the net income and principal from the trust.

7.

The current trustees have the legal authority and responsibility to act for the benefit o[
the petitioner in accordance with the terms of the trust. Distributions from the trust are
determined by the current trustees and they are permitted to exercise full discretion with
respect to such distributions.

8.

Undue hardship does not exist because the petitioner (i.e., those acting for the petitioner)
has not exhausted all legal means to gain access to the trust.

i

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Atticus Family Tiust is a Medicaid Qualifying Trust and the asset contained within the trust
is an available asset within the Medicaid piogram as described in sec 1902(k) of the Social
Secunt> Act
REASONS FOR HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION
The Medicaid piogiam was enacted in J965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act (the Act)
as a cooperative federal state progiam designed to provide health care payment for necd>
individuals Pnor to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, the Medicaid statute
governing tiusts was found in Sec 1902(k) of the Act Because the Atticus Family Trust was
created prior to 1993, that statute remains operable in deciding this case The statute leads in
it's entirety
(1) In the case of a Medicaid qualifying trust (described in paragraph (2)), the amounts
from the trust deemed available to a grantor, for purposes of subsection (a)(17), is the
maximum amount of payments that ma> be permitted under the teims of the trust to be
distributed to the grantor assuming the lull exercise of discretion by the trustee or trustees
for the distribution of the maximum amount to the grantoi For purposes of the prev IOUS
sentence the term giantoi' means the individual referred to in paiagiaph (2)
(2) For purposes of the subsection, a Medicaid qualifying trust1 is a trust or similar legal
de\ ice established (other than by w ill) by an individual (or an individual s spouse) under
w Inch the individual may be the beneficiary of all or part of the payments lrom the trust
and the distubution of such payments is determined by one or more trustees who are
permitted to exercise any discretion with respect to the distribution to the individual
(3) This subsection shall apply without regard to
(A) whether or not the Medicaid qualifying trust is irrevocable or is established
foi purposes other than to enable a grantor to qualify for medical assistance under
this title or
(B) whether or not the discretion described in paragraph (2) is actually exercised
(4) I he State may w an c 'he application of this subsection w ith respect to an mdiv idual
wheic the State determines that such application would work an undue hardship
The Medicaid agency determined that the Atticus Family Tiust satisfied all of the elements of
a Medicaid qualifying trust (MQT) as descubed above and determined that the trust asset (the
piopertv) was available to the petitioner, and countable towards the Medicaid asset limit
The petitionees legal representative, Mr Robbins, stated that the piopert> held within the trust
was in vocably gifted to the petitioners two children (Rene Pace and Robeit Perez) and hei
niece and nephew (Jean Juoudek and Tom Juoudek) in September 1992 As such, Mr Robbins
argued that the tiust piovisions prohibit "taking back the gift" and that the only value left to the
petitioner is a ' valueless lifetime use nght " Theiefore theie aie no payments that can be
permitted foi the benefit of the petitioner and the " sole 1 rust asset, undeveloped land, is not
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an available asset "
Medicaid law states that a trust must be considered an available asset il the trust meets the
conditions of an MQT Thei c are three essential elements necessary for an M Q T first, the trust
must be established by the individual, second, the individual must be the beneficiary of all or
pait of the payments from the trust, and third, the distribution of such payments is determined
by one or more trustees who arc permitted to exercise any discretion regarding distribution to
the individual
I he trust mint be established by (he indnidual
The trust begins by stating, 'This TRUST
AGREEMENT is entered into by and between JANET PACE PEREZ (referred to as the
'Trustor"), and JANET PACE PEREZ and ROBERTA JEAN F L O U R N O Y or then
v
,,
SUCLCSSOIS, as Trustee (icfeired to ds ' ^rustee ) " Article I, Creation of Trust, continues,' By
this agreement Tiustoi transfeis and delivers to the Trustee the property descrrbed in the
attached Schedule A The property so described shall constitute the "trust estate," and shall
be held IN TRUST and administered and distributed as provided below
The Trust shall be
irrevocable "
Clearly the trust document shows that the trust was established by the petitioner Tom Jnoudek
took exception to this interpretation stating that his mother, Robena Flournoy, was alsoatiustoi
in that the piopeity v\as originally bought and paid for by both Roberta and the petitioner
together However, there was no evidence presented which would suppoit T o m ' s position and
the actual evidence is coniiadictoiy to the assertion Not only is the petitionei the sole trustor
identified within the tiust document, the September 15, 1992, Quit-Claim deed lists only Janet
Pace Perez as the grantor who transferred the property to the trust (to be managed by the
or lginal trustees, Janet and Roberta) As the petitioner was the sole legal owner of the property
with the power to transfer the property into the trust, it must be concluded that the petitioner
established the trust with hei own property as the only trust asset
The indnidual may be the benefiacuy of all oi pan oj the payments from the trust Rene Pace
consistently aigued that her mother was not a beneficiary of the trust Rather, only she, hei
brother and two cousins were benefrcianes A complete leading of the trust document appears
to support the contention that, generally, the term "beneficiaries" applies to Rene, Robert, Tom
and Jean
However, the controlling clause of the Medicaid statute, " under which the
individual maybe the beneficiary ol all or paitot the payments , , 1 gocs beyond a simple listing
of * beneiiciancs ,,! Utah law found in the Utah Code 7S-7-103, Definitions, defines
"'Beneficiary' means a person that (i) has a piesent oi futuie beneficial intcicst in a tiust,
vested oi contingent "
As such, a beneficiary is identified as any peison who docs oi can benefit from the tiust and not
merely il a peison is specifically mentioned (or not) as a beneficialy in willing

1

In laci there are no clauses within the trust document which specifically lists and identifies 'beneficiaries '

by name
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It is clear that the petitioner benefits from the trust property Article IV(A)(2) states in part
Trustees Janet Pace Perez
shall be entitled to use and enjoyment of the piopeity for then
lifetimes Aiticle IV(A)(7) states in pait ' T h e Iiustmay use the " c o m m o n " land for purposes
of generating income " Aiticle IVCQ states in part "Notwithstanding the rcquiiements stated
above Trustor shall have the powei to altei the teims of the use or disposition of the property
duung hei lifetime, provided that she may not pledge the property for the benefit of hei
individual ci editors, or change anv homesite of the beneficiaries
Othei than the homesite, the
Trustor reserves the right to change the beneficial interest ds she may wish " Article V (A)
states in patt 'Trustee may also retain funds in tiust for an> purpose sufficient to Trustee
Aiticle V(B) states "If Tiustor or any Beneficialy shall come undei any physical or mental
disability, in addition to the net income of the Trustors separate estate the 1 iustee may pay to
01 appl) (01 the benefit of Trustor so much of" the principal of the disabled Irustoi s separate
estate as the Tiustee shall deem necessaiv foi the Trustor s propei support, health, and
maintenance to be paid out of all beneficial ics' shares, as the case ma> be, provided that no
payment shall be made where other means of support are available, including insurance or
public assistance " Article IX(F) states in pait "During the lifetime of 1 rustor, the Trustor shall
have the power to direct the Trustee in writing, from time to time to retain, sell, exchange, 01
lease an> property ol the tiust estate on specified terms and conditions, and to invest funds of
the trust estate that Tiustor specifies " Article XI(P) states in pertinent pait "This Trust may
be amended only in wnting b\ Trustor during her lifetime, provided that she may not amend to
the benefit of any creditor of hers
Thus the petitioner has a piesent benefit in the use and enjoyment of the trust property (except
(01 two acres given as gifts) during hei lifetime The petitioner retains the right to control the
property held within the trust and can arrange foi income generating schemes on the' common '
land (potential future benefit), to sell, exchange, or lease the property (present and future
benefit) The petitioner has the ability to alter the terms of use or disposition of the property
within the tiust (potential futuie benefit) The petitioner, now acknowledged as disabled, has
the piesent right to the net income and principal fiom the trust The pi esiding officer deter mines
that the petitioner holds significant beneficial interest (both piesent and futuie) in the tiust and
that she is indeed a beneficiary of the payments from the trust
The disti ibution of such pa\ments is determined IA one oi moie trustees
exercise an) discretion with respect to the distribution

who ate permuted to

Originally the petitioner and her sister, Roberta Flour noy, were the I rsted trustees Their tiustee
duties ha\e now been taken ovci by Robeit Peiezand Tom Jnoudek as Roberta is deceased and
the petitioner is incapacitated Despite who is acting as tiustec(s), dn\ tiustee has the legal
responsibility to administer the trust according to the terms of the trust Although l o r n Jnoudek
testified that he (as a successor trustee) would not authorize any payments from the trust to the
petitioner, he has a legal responsibility to do so and is explicitly lequircd to do so according to
the terms of the tiust Aiticle Xl(K)(2)(c), Effect ol Detciinitiation ol Incapacity, states in
pertinent part the Trustee shall have power and authority on such incapacitated Irustoi s or

Trustee's behalf to exercise or perform any act, power, duty, right or obligation whatsoever that
such Trustor or Trustee may have ... The power granted to the Trustee under (c) above shall be
construed and interpreted as a general durable powei of attorney to act as such Trustor's
attorney in fact and agent in his name and for his benefit and shall be in addition to all other
powers bestowed upon the Trustee by this agreement." Thus, the successor trustees now hold
the authority to take any and all actions originally granted to the petitioner as Trustor and
original Trustee of the trust. As explained, this includes the discretion to sell, exchange or lease
the property, to alter the terms of the use or disposition of the property and to change the
beneficial interests of the trust Most importantly, the trustee(s) have the discretion to distribute
income and principal as contained in Article V(B). "If Trustor or any Beneficiary shall come
under any physical or mental disability, in addition to the net income of the Trustor's separate
estate, the Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of Trustor so much of the principal of the
disabled Trustor's separate estate as the Trustee shall deem necessary for the Trustor's proper
support, health, and maintenance, to be paid out of all beneficiaries shares, as the case may be,
provided that no payment shall be made where other means of support are available, including
insurance, or public assistance." It is determined here that the trustee(s) are permitted to
exercise full discretion with respect to the distribution of potential trust payments.
It is the conclusion here that the trust meets all requirements of a Medicaid qualifying trust. The
trust was established by the petitioner, the petitioner is a beneficiary of ail or part of the
payments from the trust, and the distribution of such payments is determined by one or more
trustees who are permitted to exercise any discretion with respect to the distribution to the
petitioner.
Having determined that the trust is an MQT and therefore countable as an asset for Medicaid
eligibility, it is necessary to address other arguments presented at the hearing which primarily
address the value of the property held in trust.
There v\ as much discussion concerning Article V(B), particularly the wording "separate estate."
Mr. Robbins argued that the entire trust estate was "gifted" to the petitioner's children and niece
and nephew. As such, the only "separate estate" available to the petitioner (and the other
original trustee, Roberta Flournoy) was her specific right of the "use and enjoyment of the
property for their lifetimes" (Article IV(A)(2)). Further, he stated that there was not a value or
market which could be placed on the petitioner's exclusive "use" right and thus there was no
countable Medicaid asset.
Contrary to the determination that the entire trust estate was "gifted" to the petitioner's children
and niece and nephew upon establishment of the trust, the presiding officer finds that only
specific !/2-acie lots were "gifted" leaving the remaining 48 acres "ungifted" and comprising the
petitioner's "separate estate." Article IV(A), Creation of Beneficial Interests, clearly states in
pertinent parts: "Trustor hereby irrevocably gifts beneficial ownership in the Trust to her
children ... and her niece and nephew ... as follows (emphasis added): (1) Trustor declares that
she reserves to her children and niece and nephew named above for their exclusive use, a
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minimum of Vidcit each out of a total 50 acre parcel of property on a fust come, first sei ve1
basis to be used as a homesite for each beneficiary foi such beneficiary's use (2) Trustees
Janet Pace Peiez and/or Roberta Jean Floumoy shall be entitled to the use and enjoyment of the
ptopert) foi their lifetimes with limited use leserved to the beneficiaries provided that it does
not conflict with the use by Janet Pace Perez and/or Roberta Jean Flournoy (6) Without the
concurrence of the Trustees and other beneficiaries no beneficiary shall be entitled to sell or
otherwise dispose of encumber or mortgage his or her interest in the property or the Vi acre
homesite (7) The Trust may use the 'common' land for putposes of generating income (8)
No beneficiary can be forced to move fiom the piopeity once their homesite is established "
It is not until the death of the petitioner that hei childien and niece and nephew are entitled to
ownership of any propeit) beyond their previously selected Vi acie sites as stated in Article VI
Disposition on Death of Tiustoi 'Upon the death of the Trustor, the Tiustee shall maisha! the
assets of the trust estate and do the follow ing (1) Divide the Estate in four (4) equal shai es
of beneficial interest to the children of the Trustor and the niece and nephew of Trustor (2)
The surviving Co Trustees may thereafter liquidate and distribute the Trust to the beneficiaries
If not so liquidated (partially or lull>) the property shall continue to be held in trust "
It is concluded here that the entue trust estate (50 acres) was not "gifted' to the petitioner s
children and niece and nephew, rather, only potential Vz acre homesites were irrevocably
gifted ' The 48 acres of lungifted' piopeity remain the petitioner's "separate estate " Article
V allows for disbursements from the net income and principal of the "separate estate for the
cate ot the petitionei once she is under physical 01 mental disability
Mr Robbins aigued that there were unique factois with the piopeity which must be considered
when determining a value for the property He stated that two-thirds of the property is creek
gully and that the canyon wall is crumbling Eaiher in the >ear, a deadly accident occurred
along the same strip when the canvon wall collapsed and killed a young boy Mr Robbins
stated that the descnption of the pioperty in the tiust wains in Article IV(A)(4) that, "In the
event of eiosion of a beneficial) 's i/i-acie choice of land, icndenng the land unsuitable for a
homesite, said portion can be extended
Robert Perez testified that the Kan ib area is "fauly depressed" concerning land values and that
piopertv is not selling
Rene Pace testified that at one point her cousin Jean listed the property for sale over the internet
for $45 000 00 but theie weie no senous offers
The Medicaid agency detei mined that the \ alue of the property (SO acres) w as $82,219 00 based
on a 2003 Kane County Notice of property Valuation and Tax Changes document Robert Peiez
testified that he has taken the lesponsibility to pay the piopeity taxes foi the last couple of >cais
but no family mem be 1 has challenged the assessed value and tax Greater weight is gi\cn here
to the county \aluation It is reasonable to conclude that if the property were of much less value
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than the official valuation, the family would have taken steps for a reassessment. Therefore, the
presiding officer values the 48 acres of available property at $78,930.24.
The petitioner's representative and family also presented testimony regarding the intent of the
petitioner in creating the trust (to provide lt a safe haven or refuge for family members which
would remain unencumbered and beyond the reach of any creditors"). However, the Medicaid
statute at paragraph 3 of section 1902(k) explicitly states that the M Q T rules will apply "without
regard to whether or not the medicaid qualifying trust is irrevocable or is established for
purposes other than to enable a grantor to qualify for medical assistance under this title." This
case is illustrative of conclusions reached by the United States Congress when explaining the
purpose of the MQT law:
Our conclusion reflects the legislative concern that the Medicaid program not be used as
an estate planning tool. The Medicaid program would be at fiscal risk if individuals were
permitted to preserve assets for their heirs while receiving Medicaid benefits from the
state. Congress enacted the Medicaid qualifying trust provision as an addition to the
provisions designed to assure that individuals receiving nursing home and other long-term
care services under Medicaid are in fact poor and have not transferred assets that should
be used to purchase the needed services before Medicaid benefits are made available. (H.
Rep. No. 99-265, 99,h Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1985)).
It is the decision here that the trust is an MQT (and therefore countable as a Medicaid asset) and
that the trust asset is valued at $78, 930.24 which is the maximum amount (net income plus
principal) which can be distributed to the petitioner assuming the full exercise of discretion by
the current trustees.
Finally, arguments pertaining to the "undue hardship" clause of section 1902(k)(4) were heard
at the hearing. The Utah Medicaid policy concerning undue hardship is found in The Utah
Medical Manual, Vol.IIIM Sec.5 11-8 and reads in pertinent parts:
(7) The assets of a trust can be excluded from countable assets when there would be an
undue hardship on the client if the tiust assets were counted. An undue hardship exists
if both of the following conditions are met:
A. The client has exhausted all reasonable legal means to gain access to
the trust which can include petitioning a court or trustee to allow access
to trust funds. It is not reasonable to require the client to take action if a
knowledgeable source (such as the client's lawyer or financial institution)
confirms that it is doubtful those efforts will succeed.
That
knowledgeable source must explain the reason for the decision ... It is not
reasonable to require the client to take action more costly than the value
of the asset.
B. Without Medicaid coverage for institutional ... care, the client will not
be able to get the medical care needed AND the client is at risk of death
or permanent disability without that care. This must be verified by a
physician's statement. Additionally, the client must verify that the client
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and the client s spouse or parents(s) cannot aflord to meet the client s
medical needs at home
The Medicaid agency evaluated undue hardship based on documentation provided by the
petitioner s family The agency determined that undue hardship did not exist in this instance
stating "Information we have received does not indicate all legal means to make the trust
available have been exhausted Requirement A of the requirement for undue hardship has not
been met
Pertaining to Condition B, the client is receiving the caie needed There is a
question as to whether pharmacy is being met but no conclusive evidence that prescriptions are
not being provided by the Kane County Hospital Conditions A and B must be met for undue
hardship to be granted Since the) have not been met the request for Undue Hardship is
denied
The documentation provided by the petitioner s famil) in then support for an undue hardship
exemption included two statements from Dr Bowman attesting to the fact that the petitioner is
complete!) dependent on skilled nursing care tor her daily needs/' and that, "Our hospital
has been pioviding her medicatrons for the past five months and has had to write off these
expenses " Rene Pace presented a statement to the agency voicing her understanding that she
felt all reasonable legal means to make the trust asset available to her mother had been
exhausted Vis Pace also stated that neither she nor her brother Robeit would be able to
properl) care for their mother outside of the caie center Also presented foi undue hardship
consideration was a statement by Stephen Howclls, Chief Financial Officei of the Kane County
Hospital, stating that in his opinion, the petitioner was not a beneficiary of the trust because
there was no "method in the trust for those funds to be accessed for Mrs Perez' care " Mr
Robbins had provided the family with a statement dated March 21, 2005, wherein he expressed
his legal opinion that the tiust asset was not available to the petitioner because she is not a
beneficiary of the trust asset and, "In fact, she is expressly forbidden to pledge any asset of the
Trust for the benefit of hei creditois It strikes me as somewhat anomalous that the property is
being uiged as a disqualifying asset even though Mrs Perez is expressly denied the right to use
the piopetty to pay an) of her debts or obligations'' Mr Robbins also opined that he is familiar
with the propeity and that the value of the piopeity was much reduced due to the expmding
creek bed, eroding can) on walls, sandy soil, sinkholes, and general narrow confines of the land
He concluded that, " in any kind of forced sale situation, the propeity would realize only a
nominal value "
The presiding officer finds no undue hardship at this time because the fust criterion (that all
reasonable legal means to gain access to the trust have been exhausted) is not met MQT law
dictates that the trust asset is available to the petitioner If the trustees refuse to disburse the
asset to the petitioner they would not only be failing in their fiduciary capacity but the petitioner
would be required, at a minimum, to petition a couit to allow disbuisement bcfoic a hardship
determination could be rendered Although it is understood that the pctrtionei suffers from
severe medical impaiimcntsandicquiies long teim caie, theicis no legal basis to determine that
her medical needs cannot be covered by the trust asset A hardship waiver cannot be granted
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RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION
The decision by the Medicaid agency to deny the petitioner's application because the asset held
within the trust is available and countable is hereby AFFIRMED. No further agency action is
necessary.
RIGHT TO REVIEW
This Recommended Decision will be automatically reviewed by the Department of Health,
Division of Health Care Financing, prior to its release. Both the Recommended Decision and
a Final Agency Action, which represent the results of that review, will be released
simultaneously by the Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing.
DATED this / /

day of August 2005

6&Z4&DC^JGLAS/lENSEN
HEARING OFFICER
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ATTICUS FAMILY TRUST

This TRUST AGREEMENT is entered into by and between
JANET PACE PEREZ (referred to as the "Trustor") r and JANET
PACE PEREZ and ROBERTA JEAN FLOURNOY, or their successors, as
Trustee (referred to as "Trustee").
ARTICLE I
CREATION OF TRUST
By this agreement, Trustor transfers and delivers to the
Trustee, "the property described in the attached Schedule A,
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the Trustee.
The property so described, together with any other property
that may become subject to this trust shall constitute the
"trust estate," and shall be held IN TRUST and administered
and distributed as provided below. This trust shall be known
as the
"ATTICUS
FAMILY TRUST."
The
Trust
shall be
irrevocable,
ARTICLE II
STATEMENT REGARDING FAMILY
Trustor declares that her
following:
RENEf ELIZABETH PACE
PEREZ.

to
S^T

\N

only
TULAK

children are the
and ROBERT THOMAS

ARTICLE III
CONTROL BY INITIAL TRUSTEES

At all times that JANET PACE PEREZ shall be the Trustee,
she shall administer the Trust with her Co-Trustee without
requirement to consult,the beneficiaries* After said

CALLUN & WESTFALL
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Co-Trustees
Trustees

cease

shall

decisions

to

serve

control

the

as

Trustee(s),

trust, provided

the

Successor

that

the

major

the property

shall

to

sell,

subdivide or encumber

be concurred

in by

a majority of a quorum of beneficiaries.

Such concurrence
shall not

of a majority of a quorum

apply

of

beneficiaries

in the case of the Trust being

administered

by the initial Trustees, or the survivor of them.
shall consist
quorum of

of

lines

three

(3) beneficiaries•

A quorum

A majority of a

shall be represented at a meeting

held

for

this purpose, w i t h notice sent to the last known address of a
beneficiary.
if

A meeting may be held by telephone

so specified

five

(5)

days

written proxy
each of

the

conference

in the notice; notice to be given
in

writing

prior

shall be allowed*

four

to

the

meeting.
If

represented

any vote

beneficiary

line

beneficiary f

the majority of that line shall control.

beneficiaries

be

Vote

by

There shall be one vote for

(4) beneficiary lines.
shall

at least

by

more

for a

than

one

If any

are minors, their vote shall be controlled by

the Trustees.
ARTICLE IV
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY
AND OPERATION OF TRUST
A.

CREATION OF BENEFICIAL INTERESTS
At

the

inception

of the Trust, the

shall be that certain property
set

forth

at

Schedule

A.

bene£jL^^
niece

and

PACE

nephew,

the

Trust

TULAK

and

JEAN

VIRGINIA

Property

in the State of Utah

Trustor hereby

in

RENE'ELIZABETH

located

Trust

irrevocably

to

her

ROBERT THOMAS

gifts

children,

PEREZ, and

JIROUDEK,

aka

her

JEAN

V*

FLOURNOY and THOMAS RONALD JIROUDEK, as follows:
1}

Trustor

and niece
minimum
first
C VLLFAX &

and nephew named above for their

of

property

declares that she reserves

1/2

acre

described

serve"

\\'i:STFALL

each
at

basis,

out

of a total

Exhibit
to

be

A hereto,

used

as

a

to her

children

exclusive use, a
50-acre

on

a

parcel

"first

homesite

for

of

come,
each

^

beneficiary, for such beneficiary's use
(*io^ beneficial
interest is intended to be given to any other person,
although the beneficiaries may allow their family, guests or
invitees to use the property for living purposes with the
express written consent of the Trustees) .
2)
Trustees, JANET PACE PEREZ and/or ROBERTA JEAN
FLOURNOY shall be er^ i .t^j^d to use and enjoyment of the
property for their /lifetimes^) including specific use of the
existing R.V. trailer~wK1Tch has been set up on the property
complete with utility hookups, with limited use reserved to
the beneficiaries provided that it does not conflict with the
use by JANET PACE PEREZ and/or ROBERTA JEAN FLOURNOY.
3) JEAN VIRGINIA JIROUDEK (a/k/a Jean V. Flournoy) , is
the only one who has selected her approximately one-half
(1/2) acre homesite and presently resides on the land because
yshe volunteered to be the resident caretaker to protect the
property from vandals and other concerns. Therefore, JEAN
VIRGINIA JIROUDEK is guaranteed the parcel she has chosen, as
follows :
Beginning at the West Quarter Corner of Section 4,
Township 44 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and running thence North to fifty (50)
feet, more or less. South of the (power, water and
sewer) RV Hookup, along the Section Line; thence
East to the West Rim of the Canyon? thence South
along the West Canyon Rim to directly East of the
BLM Quarter Corner Marker; thence West to the point
of beginning.
If this description does not equal at least 1/2 acre of solid
topland, the description is to be changed to extend South of
the Quarter Corner Marker until it does*
It is to be noted here that the improvements and
structures on this specific portion of the land belong to
JEAN VIRGINIA JIROUDEK and are not a part of the Trust, as
she paid for them with her own personal money.
Since the utilities that run from Navajo Drive to JEAN
VIRGINIA JIROUDEK 1 s homesite were partially paid for by JANET
PACE PEREZ, and the City of Kanab has allowed for only one
water meter at this time, it is to be understood that the
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j>r

utilities

are

to

be

shared

(if

possible)

by

the

other

beneficiaries until and if provision can be m a d e for separate
utilities
shared,

and

water

the parties

themselves

unless

meter(s) .
shall work

the

While

the

utilities

out payment

Trustee

shall

for usage

notify

the

are
among

affected

parties that there is enough money in a trust account to pay
for them.
4)

In

the

event

of

erosion

of

a

beneficiary's

1/2-acre choice of land, rendering the land unsuitable for a
homesite,
said

said portion

extended

can be extended, provided

portion

does

not

encroach

only

on

that

another

beneficiary's homesite selection, or a different site can be
selected.
5}
egress

to

An easement
all

other

shall be provided
homesites,

after

for ingress and
all

four

(4)

beneficiaries have designated their 1/2-acre choice of land,
6)

Without

the

concurrence

of

the

Trustees

and

other beneficiaries, no beneficiary shall be entitled to sell
or

otherwise

dispose

of,

encumber

or

mortgage

his

or

her

land

for

majority

of

interest i^T^the property or the 1/2-acre homesite.
/ ly

The

Trust

may

use

the

"common"

purposes/ of generating income, provided that:
a)

The

Trustees

and

a

beneficiaries agree to such project as per ARTICLE III;
b)
upon, block

The

access

project

to, or

does

otherwise

not

displace,

invade

or

infringe

devalue

the

personal homesite of any of the beneficiaries;
c)

The project generates income to support:
i)
ii)

Expenses of project/venture
Expenses

of

maintenance

of

property

(i.e. property taxes, insurance, assessments, trust expenses,
etc.)
iii)

Expenses and support of beneficiaries

directly involved in project/venture.

iv)

Confotms to local, state and federal

ordinances and laws.
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v) Does not destroy the land, or cause it
to lose value through abuse or neglect.
vi)
Does not create undue or unjust
financial hardship on any of the beneficiaries.
^Si^^^^J
1
8) No beneficiary can be forced to move from the
"4
-\
property once their homesite is established unless it is
I
found that benef i^ci^i^^S-.^^
illegal activities on
\
1

V9S^^^^^^fiffiCEBmSSS2eos%i

No Beneficiary may add to the Trust*
Initial
Trustees may add property to the Trust but any such addition
may be accounted separately if required by the document
conveying any such assets.
C. CONTROL OF TRUSTOR
Notwithstanding
the
requirements
stated
above,
Trustor shall have the power to alter the terms of the use or
disposition of the property during her lifetime, provided
that she may not pledge the property for the benefit of her
individual
creditors, or
change
any
homesite
of
the
beneficiaries
after
a
homesite
is
selected
and
the
beneficiary has made material improvements to the homesite.
Until then, the Trustor may modify the beneficial interests
regarding the homesite* Other thaiL the_horaesite, the Trustorreserves the right to chaj

ARTICLE V
DISPOSITION OF TRUST ESTATE DURING
LIFETIME OF TRUSTOR
A.

DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND PRINCIPAL
During the lifetime of the Trustor, the Trustee
may pay to the benef iciaries, in the discretion of the
Trustee, the up-to-the net income of the Trust Estate, (if
any) quarter-annually or in more frequent installments.

.LLIAN A
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Trustee may also retain funds in trust for any purpose
sufficient to Trustee.
B
INVASION OF PRINCIPAL BY TRUSTEE
If Trustor or any Beneficiary shall come under any
physical or mental disability, in addition to^the net income
of the Trustor f s separate estatef the Trustee may pay to or
apply for the benefit of Trustor so much of the principal of
the disabled Trustor's separate estate as the Trustee shall
deem necessary for the Trustor? s^rop~erTr6uppor^^
r^ainFenanceTVAbrcbe^paid. jput:of allij&RSneficiaTfTes^r sbare'sT^-as"*i
:theT:caseTm^^^
payment" shall^be^m^de^he'Fe7vV
other- means -of -support -are -available , :anc^l_ud^^j£^^
public <assx.sjtance.sr

b & < ^ f (sfyAtO

ARTICLE VI
DISPOSITION ON DEATH OF TRUSTOR
Upon the death of the Trustor, the Trustee shall
marshall the assets of the trust estate, including any assets
that devolve to the Trust by the testamentary disposition and
do the following:
1) Divide the Estate in four (4) equal shares of
beneficial
interest
to the children
of
the
Trustor,
1
RENE ELIZABETH PACE TULAK and ROBERT THOMAS PEREZ, and the
niece and nephew of Trustor, JEAN VIRGINIA JIROUDEK and
THOMAS RONALD JIROUDEK.
If any of the four (4) named
beneficiaries shall predecease the Trustor, that deceased
beneficiary's share shall be held in Trust by the Trustee for
the benefit of that person's living children, distributed in
the same manner as ARTICLE VIII, with respect to children.
The final discretion of the Trustee shall control.
)
2)
The
surviving Co-Trustees
may
thereafter
^liquidate and distribute the Trust to the beneficiaries upon
the affirmative vote of three of the four Co-Trustees (if
there are 4 ) ; two of three (if there are three); two of two
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(if there a^e two), or at the discretion of the Trustee, if
-there is on£ (1) Trustee. If not so liquidated (partially or
fully) the property shall continue to be held in tr^st with
the
property
administered
for
the
benefit
of
the
beneficiaries. Notwithstanding the above, the Trustees may
not liquidate the 1/2 acre homesite and access and utility of
any beneficiary who is living on the project without that
beneficiary's express written consent.
ARTICLE VII
DISPOSITION OF CHILDREN'S SHARES
Upon the death of any beneficiary, his or h£*" share
shall be given to that person's living children, a^d if no
living chil^^en, then to the surviving beneficiaries of
Trustor, or their children if they shall not survive. In the
event that any beneficial interest shall be payable to a
minor, the trustee(s) shall have the obligation to apply the
income from the Trust allocated to this interest to the
benefit of £he minor, provided that principal may be invaded
if necessary to pay education, general welfare< o? health
needs, as cJetenuined by the Trustee (s) , provided that no
payments shall be made if insurance payments ot
public
assistance . ^re otherwise available. If liquidation of the
Trust is elected and any beneficiary shall be a minor, it
shall be paid to their parent Cs) having custody or the Legal
guardian, for the benefit of the child, provided that no
payment shall be made to JERRY THOMAS TULAK or his relatives
(except the beneficiaries) and in this event, the Trustees
shall continue to hold such minor's share in trust until age
twenty-one (21)•
ARTICLE VIII
"'

jy4.

.^n.. ', ,'' III*'- f , '

^P^Tfa

^PqWERS "OF *TRriSTEE^
To

cariry

AX & WlTSTI A L t

out

the

purposes

of

any

trust

created

under

this instrument and subject to any limitations stated
elsewhere in this instrument, the Trustee is vested with the
following powers with respect to the trust estate and any
part of it, in addition to those powers now or hereafter
conferred by law:
A.
STATUTORY POWERS
All powers enumerated in the Utah Probate Code as
it exists on the date of this instrument, as though such
powers were herein set forth in full, without necessity for
petition to the court having jurisdiction over this Trust*
B
POWER TO RETAIN PROPERTY OR BUSINESS IN TRUST
To continue to hold any property, including shares
of the stock of any Trustee under this instrument, and to
operate at the risk of the trust estate any business received
or acquired under the trust by the Trustee as long as the
Trustee shall deem advisable; provided, however, that except
as to a residence or other property held for the personal use
of the Trustor, unproductive or underproductive property
shall not be held as an asset of the trusts established
hereunder for more than a reasonable time during the lifetime
of the Trustor without such Trustor's written consent.
C.

POWER OF SALE, EXCHANGE AND REPAIR
To manage, control, grant options on, sell (for
cash or on deferred payments), convey, exchange, partition,
divide, improve and repair trust property,
D.
POWER TO INSURE
To carry, at the expense of the trust, insurance of
such kinds and in such amounts as the Trustee shall deem
advisable to protect the trust estate and Trustee against any
hazard.
E.
POWER TO COMMENCE OR DEFEND LITIGATION
To commence or defend litigation with respect to
the trust or any property of the trust estate as the Trustee
may deem advisable, at the expense of the trust.

G A L U A N & \\*I:STFALL

F.

INVESTMENT POWERS
To invest and reinvest all or any part of the trust
estate
in such common or preferred
stock, shares of
investment trusts, and investment companies, bonds t municipal
bonds
or
other obligations of political
subdivisions,
debentures, mortgages, deeds of trust, notes, real estate, or
other property as the Trustee in the Trustee's absolute
discretion may select, including any common trust fund
administered by any Trustee under this instrument, and the
Trustee may continue to hold in the form in which received
(or the form to which changed by reorganization, stock split,
stock dividend, or other like occurrence) any securities or
other property the Trustee may acquire at any time under this
trust, it being Trustor's express desire and intention that
the Trustee shall have full power to invest and reinvest the
trust funds without being restricted to and forms of
investment that the Trustee otherwise may be permitted to
make by law; and the investments need not be diversified.
G.
DETERMINATION OF PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AND OWNERSHIP
Ownership of the Trust Estate shall be determined
by percentage of ownership that the beneficial interest
account shall bear to the total (initially determined by the
fair market value of the property) • All cash expense of the
Trust shall be paid out of Trustor's sharer until her death,
after which all expenses of the Trust (except last expenses
and taxes of Trustor) shall be shared and allocated according
to beneficial interest. All income, losses and depreciation
shall be shared according to beneficial interest* Generally
accepted accounting principles shall be used, subject to the
direction above,
H,
DECISIONS AFFECTING TAXES
If no Personal Representative of the Trustor's
estate is appointed following a Trustor's death, the Trustee
acting under this instrument shall, in determining federal
estate and income tax liabilities, have discretion to select
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n

the valuation date, to determine whether
allowable

expenses

deductions

or

as

shall

be

federal

used

income

as

tax

any

or

all of the

federal

estate

deductions

(with

discretion as to any applicable state taxes) , to
redemption

date

of

any

United

States

tax
like

select the

obligations

that

are

eligible for redemption at par in payment of t a x e s , to make all
other

elections, and to

take

all other

appropriate

actions

with respect to taxation of Trustor or the trust estate,
I,

ADJUSTMENT TO COMPENSATE FOR TAX DECISIONS
Except

as

otherwise

provided

in

this

instrument/

the Trustee shall have absolute discretion, but shall not be
required,

to

make

adjustments

in

the

rights

of

any

beneficiaries or among the principal and income accounts, to
compensate

for

election

that

directly

or

the
the

consequences
Trustee

indirectly,

of

of

any

tax

decision

believes

has

had

the

preferring

one

or

effect,

beneficiary

or

group of beneficiaries over another.
J,

DEALINGS WITH PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
The Trustee, in the Trustee's discretion, may make

loans

at

the

Representative

prevailing
of

the

rates

of

Trustor's

interest
estate

to

on

the

such

Personal

terms

and

conditions that the Trustee shall determine, and may purchase
at the fair market value thereof, and retain as assets of the
trust, any real and personal property held

in the

Trustor's

estate.
K.

RIGHT TO RENOUNCE
If no Personal Representative of a Trustor's estate

is

appointed

authorized
with

the

following

a

Trustor's

(except to the extent
provisions

of

this

death,

the

fundamentally

instrument

and

Trustee

is

inconsistent

the

Trustor's

estate plan) to renounce, in whole or in p a r t , any devise or
legacy or any
(including

a

time within

interest in any trust for a Trustor's
trust

nine

created

(9) months

under
after

this

instrument),

the date

which created the interest in the Trustor*
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of

the

benefit
at

any

transfer

ARTICLE IX
PROVISIONS RESPECTING TRUSTEE
A.
SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE
In case either Trustee resigns or is unable to act
for any reason, "the following shall act as Successor Trustee,
in the ordernamed:
1. ^ The survivor of the initial Trustees.
^2jJ?
ROBERT THOMAS PEREZ and THOMAS RONALD JIROUDEK,
as Co-Tr^tees , with a majority of beneficiaries as set forth
in ARTICLE III.
3*
All
four
(4)
beneficiaries
acting
as
Co-Trustees.
The decision of a majority of Co-Trustees shall controlf
except as otherwise provided. If there shall be only two (2)
Trustees, both must agree•
B.
WAIVER OF BOND
No bond shall be required of any Trustee named in
this instrument.
C.
LIMITATION UPON INDIVIDUAL TRUSTEE
Notwithstanding
any
other
provision
of
this
instrument to the contrary, no person acting as Trustee
hereunder shall participate as Trustee in the exercise of any
Trustee's power or discretion which would have the effect of
discharging any of such person's legal obligations or which
is exercisable in favor of such person, his estate, his
creditors or the creditors of his estate, including (but
without limitation thereto) any power or discretion of the
Trustee to invade principal for the benefit of such person;
and any such power or discretion shall reside solely in the
disinterested Trustee. This limitation on such person shall
apply only to any power or discretion exercisable by him as
Trustee and shall not apply to any power or discretion herein
conferred upon such person solely in his individual capacity.
In addition, no individual Trustee shall possess
or exercise any incidents of ownership over any life
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insurance policies on such Trustee's life that are included
in the trust estate, and the possession of and power to
exercise such incidents of ownership shall reside solely in
the disinterested Trustee•
D.
NO COMPENSATION TO TRUSTEE
The Trustee shall not be entitled to compensation
for his or her services, but shall be compensated for the
services of counsel retained by him or her, and other
out-of-pocket expenses, including services in connection vith
the termination in whole or in part of any trust hereunder.
E.
AUTHORITY OF TRUSTOR TO TRANSFER
ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST
At any time and front time to time the TrjJusi^LT^sh^ll
have full power to change the situs of any trust created
property constituting the trust estate, or any part of the
property, to any other state in these United States in which
she may then be domiciled and to employ whatever assistants
are necessary for this purpose* If the Trustor should become
a nonresident of Utah while she is a Trustee hereunder, she
shall retain the power to administer any trust property
remaining in Utah and such removal from such state shall not
be ground for removal of her as Trustee of any trust
hereunder.
Such power to transfer the situs of any trust
hereunder for purposes of administration or to remove any
property constituting the trust estate shall not be denied to
the Trustor on the ground that any Trustee hereunder is
unable or unwilling to continue as the Trustee after such
transfer or removal, and in such case the provisions above
prescribed for the appointment of a successor Trustee shall
govern as applicable.
F.
INVESTMENT POWER SOLELY IN TRUSTOR
During the lifetime of Trustor, the Trustor shall
have the power to direct the Trustee in writing, from
time to time, to retain, sell, exchange, or lease any
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property
of the trust estate on specified
terms and
conditions/ and to invest funds of the trust estate that
Trustor specifies. The Trustee shall comply with all such
written directions, shall have no responsibility to review
trust investments, and shall incur no liability to any
beneficiary of the trust or to any other person for following
such written direction received by it from Trustor, or for
failure to act in the absence of such written direction.
ARTICLE X
NO CONTEST

^P
***

In the event any beneficiary under this trust shall,
singularly or in conjunction with any other person or
persons, contest in any court the validity of this trust or
of Trustor's
Last Will or shall seek
to
obtain an
adjudication in any proceeding in any court that this trust
or any of its provisions or that such Will or any of its
provisions is void, or seek otherwise to void, nullify, or
set aside this trust or any of its provisions, then the right
of that person to take any interest given to him by this
trust shall be determined as it would have been determined
had the person predeceased the execution of this trust
instrument without surviving issue.
The Trustee is hereby authorized to defend, at the
expense of the trust estate, any contest or other attack of
any nature on this trust or any of its provisions.
;>
\'

ARTICLE XI
GENERAL TRUST PROVISIONS
A.

x>

y
\^

^

U

^ <A- ^ > ,
*^ ^
J\

SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION
Mo interest in the principal or income of any trust
created under this instrument shall be anticipated, assigned,
or encumbered or subject to any creditor's claim or to legal
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process f prior to its actual receipt by the beneficiary.
BMANNER OF MAKING PAYMENTS TO MINORS OR INCOMPETENTS
The Trustee, in the Trustee's discretion r may make
payments to a minor or otherfe&jjp^i<?4*arywunderdisability by
making payments to his guardian, or to any suitable person
with whom he resides, or to any qualified adult person or
trus-t company as custodian for such minor under the Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act as enacted by the state of such minor's
residence, or the Trustee may apply payments directly for the
bej^SiciaryJg^C benefit•
The Trustee, in the Trustee's
discretion, may make payments directly to a minor if, in the
Trustee's judgment, he is of sufficient age and maturity to
spend the money properly.
C.
NO PHYSICAL DIVISION OF TRUST PROPERTY REQUIRED
There need be no physical segregation or division
of the assets of the various separate trusts except as
segregation or division may be required by the termination of
any of the trusts, but the Trustee shall keep separate
accounts therefore. The Trustee may merge the assets of any
trust hereunder with those of any other trust maintained for
the same beneficiaries upon substantially the same terms and
having the same Trustee•
D.

SIMULTANEOUS DEATH
In case any income beneficiary and any remainderman
of any trust created hereunder die either simultaneously, or
under such circumstances as to render it difficult or
impossible to determine who predeceased the other, the income
beneficiary
shall
be
deemed
to
have
survived
the
remai nderman.
E.
NOTICE OF EVENTS
Until the Trustee receives written notice of any
birth, death, marriage or other event upon which the right to
receive payments from the trust estate may depend, the
Trustee shall incur no liability for disbursements of
principal or income made in good faith to any person whose

GALLIAN & W E S T F A L L
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interest n*ay have been affected by that event,
F#
TERMINATION CLAUSE REQUIRED BY LAW
Unless sooner terminated in accordance with other
provisions of this instrument, each trust created under this
instrument shall terminate twenty-one (21) years after the
death of the last survivor of the Trustor and Trustor's issue
who are living at the time of the predeceased Trustor's
death, or living at such time as this trust might earlier
become irrevocable. All principal and undistributed income
of any trust so terminated shall be distributed to the then
income beneficiaries of that trust in the proportions in
which they are, at the . time of termination, entitled to
receive the income; provided/ however, that if the rights to
income are not then fixed by the terms of the trust,
distribution
under
this
clause
shall
be
made,
by
representation, to such issue of Trustor as are then entitled
or authorized in the Trustee's discretion to receive income
payments, or, if there are no such issue of Trustor, in equal
shares to those beneficiaries who are then entitled or
authorized to receive income payments*
G. *%?DISCRETIONARY TEBMINATIOtf B Y ~ T R U S T W

. f e ^ , ^ — ~ ""

'

If, at any time, in the judgment of the Trustee, the
aggregate
fair market value of any trust
established
hereunder shall be sufficiently small that its administration
is
no
longer
economically
advisable,
the
cost
of
administration is disproportionate to the value of the
assets, or the continuation of the trust is no longer in the
best interest of the beneficiaries, the Trustee, in the
Trustee's absolute discretion, may terminate such trust and
distribute the then remaining balance thereof as in the
previous subparagraph relating to a termination required by
law.
H.

SEVERABILITY

If
any
provision
of
this
instrument
is
u n e n f o r c e a b l e , the remaining provisions s h a l l nevertheless be
MAN & WESTFALL

carried into effect.
I.
GENDER AND NUMBER
As used in this instrument, the masculine, feminine
or neuter gender, and the singular or plural number, include
the other whenever the context so indicates.
J
PARAGRAPH HEADINGS
The descriptive phrases at the head of various
paragraphs as to their content are inserted only as a matter
of convenience and reference, and in no way are intended to
be part of this instrument or to define, limit or describe
the scope or intent of the text of the particular paragraphs
to which they refer.
K.
INCAPACITY
1.
Determination of I^caPaci^y^Aj£j^£^^,t ^any ^^tiioea
the Trustee {or Successor^rjisteey--as^the -cais^n^ay^Se)iSsirall^
receive - a-written
statement^sXghkdj^hyh k S^^^^B€orXsMJ>T
Trustee^-V" personal ^physVdlan^ (or a specialist approved by
such
personal
physician, fr^'^any ~- two~v^bther -*- lic"erise<r
physicians) ^stating that he considers a Trustor or a Trustee
to be so mentally or physically incapacitated as to be
substantially unable to manage his or her financial resources
and affairs effectively or^^lioT^Tesi^st^^f ra\id~^or^ undue
^influence, and if the Trustee other than such incapacitated
Trustor or Trustee shall concur in any such statement and
shall file a similar statement in the records of the trust,
then, whether or not such Trustor or Trustee may have been
adjudicated or certified an incapacitated or incompetent
person and notwithstanding any contrary direction from such
Trustor or Trustee, such Trustor or Trustee shall be
considered to be incapacitated; p*wraffdlSgJ^£^^
a

control. « This paragraph "K" shall also apply to
determination of incapacity of any Successor Trustee.
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c3E*a
Trustor or Trustee is determined to be incapacitated as
provided above, then, during the period of such incapacity,
(a) if such Trustor or Trustee is then acting as a trustee
hereunder, he shall be deemed to have resigned; (b) any
attempt by such Trustor to exercise any of the powers
reserved by him under this agreement shall be without force
and effect; (c) the Trustee shall have power and authority on
such incapacitateS^Trusfor^sor Trustee's behalf to exercise
err pretTorm any act, power, duty, right or obligation
whatsoever that such Trustor^ or Trustee may have, relating to
any person, matter, transaction
or property, real or
personal, tangible or intangible, whether in the trust estate
or owned by Trustor or Trustee including, without limitation,
power to transfer to himself as Trustee upon the terms set n
forth in this agreement any property owned by Trustor or ^K
Trustee*
The power granted to the Trustee under (c) above r
shall be construed and interpreted as a general durable power
of attorney to act as such Trustor's attorney in fact and
agent xn his name and for his ben&JLit and shall be in
addition to all other powers bestowed upon the Trustee by
this agreement.
3. -^Restor^tTgn^ofy<3apaoi-ty. If at any time after
the determination of incapacity""under subparagraph 1 the
Trustee shall receive a written statement signed by such
Trustor's or Trustee's personal physician (or a specialist
approved by such personal physician, or any two other
licensed physicians) that such Trustor or Trustee is no
longer so mentally or physically incapacitated as to be
substantially unable to manage his financial resources and
affairs effectively or to resist fraud or undue influence,
then such Trustor or Trustee shall no longer be deemed to be
incapacitated and the provisions of subparagraph 2 shall
cease to apply. If the Trustee other than such Trustor or
Trustee shall object to such physician's statement, the
2.

%p
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Trustee may institute proceedings to determine capacity
before any appropriate court and such Trustor or Trustee
shall no longer be deemed to be incapacitated unless and
until a court having jurisdiction has determined that such
Trustor or Trustee is in fact incapacitated. Restoration of
capacity pursuant to this article or such a finding by a
court having jurisdiction over such proceedings shall not
automatically
restore Trustor as a Trustee under this
instrument.
L.
ACCRUED INCOME ON TERMINATION OF INTEREST
Other than income required to be paid to the
surviving Trustor, income accrued or in the hands of the
Trustee for payment to an income beneficiary at the termination
of
the
beneficiary's
interest
shall go to the
beneficiaries entitled to the next succeeding interest in the
proportions in which they take such interest*
M.
TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
The Trustee shall have no responsibility for any
tangible personal property transferred to the Trustee under
the terms of this instrument for so long as either Trustor
shall retain the use and possession of such property. The
Trustee shall be responsible only for such property as may be
physically delivered to it.
N.
ADMINISTRATION WITHOUT COURT SUPERVISION
Each trust created by this instrument shall be
administered free from the continuing supervision of the
court having jurisdiction over the trust; provided, however,
that the Trustee or any beneficiary may petition the court
for judicial settlement of an accounting or for any other
proper purpose,
0.
REPORTS TO BENEFICIARIES
Periodic reports shall be rendered by the Trustee
to each beneficiary eligible to receive the current income,
showing the assets then held as the principal of the trust
estate
and
all
of
the
receipts, disbursementsr
and
LLIAN &
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distributions during the period.
Such reports shall be
rendered not less frequently than annually. Reports to any
beneficiary who is under a disability may be rendered
directly to such beneficiary or to any parent, guardian, or
conservator, or to any adult person with whom the beneficiary
resides, except that no report under any circumstances shall
be made to JERRY THOMAS TULAK or his relatives (excepting
beneficiaries).
P. AMENDMENT
This Trust may be amended only in writing by
Trustor during her lifetime, provided that she may not amend
to the benefit of any creditor of hers. After the death of
the Trustor, this may be amended by a writing concurred in by
at least two-thirds
(2/3) of the remaining
beneficial
interest*
ARTICLE XII
PROVISIONS REGARDING LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
A.

PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS
During the lifetime of Trustor, the Trustee shall
be under no obligation to pay any premiums or other charges
necessary to keep in force any insurance policy in the trust
estate or in which the Trustee is named beneficiary, nor to
determine whether the same have been paid or to notify anyone
of the non-payment thereof.
Following the death of the
Trustor, the Trustee shall have the responsibility to pay
premiums and other charges on any life insurance policy owned
by the Trust, The Trustee shall keep safely each insurance
policy assigned to or deposited with the Trustee.
B«
COLLECTION OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS
Upon the death of Trustor, the Trustee shall use
reasonable efforts to collect the proceeds of any insurance
on the life of the Trustor and any other benefits payable by
reason of the Trustor's death. The Trustee shall have full
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authority to take any action it deems advisable in regard to
collection, and shall pay the expenses of collection,
including the expense of any litigation, out of the principal
of the trust estate. The Trustee shall have full authority
to make any compromise or settlement with respect to the
policies and benefits and, if it elects r may exercise any
settlement options under any policy. The Trustee may give
all necessary and proper releases of liabilities; the receipt
of the Trustee to the insurer shall be a full discharge and
the insurer is not required to see to the application of any
proceeds• The proceeds of any policy shall become principal
of the trust estate, except interest paid by the insurer,
which shall become income.
ARTICLE XIII
GOVERNING LAW
This trust has been accepted by the Trustee in the State
of Utah and, unless otherwise provided in this instrument,
its validity, construction, and all rights under it shall be
governed by the laws of that State.
Executed at
1992.

St.

George,

Utahf

on

the

JAEET PACE PEREZ

A c c e p t e d on t h i s

/^T%

d a y of J6\A&T*.
*JAl*ET PACE

ROBERTA
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tut,

~gT
Trustor
1992.

PEREZ

JE^N.FLOORNOY

roy-od a s t o F o r m
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FNTY OF WASHINGTON

On t h e
/<T^~ d a y o f
^ ^ ^ A v J r 1992, personally
>eared
before
me J a n e t
Pace
Perez
and Roberta
Jean
j u r n o y f the signers of the within instrument, who duly
mowledged to me t h a t they executed the same.
Notary Public
Commission Expires
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SCHEDULE "A"
REAL

PROPERTY LOCATED

12? KANE COONTT S T A T E

O F UTAH

-^-rwtfTMG a c che West Quarter Comer of Section 4, Township 44 South. Range ^
^ 6,v
S S ^ S J t Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 1.320.0 reVc;, chance
^
E " - ' 9 4 O " 5 f e e t ; thence South 40.-25 feet; thence East -L22.5 f e e t ; thence Souch
1-30' West 572.8 f e e t , more or l e a s , to the Ranald R- Smith property; thence
Llr
78 7 /etcthence South 75.44 feet; thence West 33.0 f e e t ; thence Souch
!262.52
5 f e, eCt
c
e
n
267.97^ f e ^
e t ; thence
We«^ 33.0
feet;
thenc L t 66.0 f e e t ; thence
^ South
^
^
^
1 / 1 6 c h

al^rsaid
said l i n e

line°«

t h &

w&sz

the West l i n e of said Section 4; thence North 1.320.0 feet along

to the point of beginning.

TOGETHER with a right-of-way over and across the following described
„r7WT„r

fefic

a

_ _

D o i n C

w h ± c h

i s North 337.96 feet and East 1.047.673

7^^,iL^T^T^^J7^\s.S

property:

feet from the

««« tW. *.« r.375.0 «.« « ,h.

point of beginning.
RESERVED
! S « S i

however, therefrom a road easement granted to Kanab Creek Ranchos. I n c . ,
to l e t t e r agreement dated September 13, 1975. described a. rollcvs:

f ^ l
; : ; g S
^ a n a T c i t y l « . . « . North 88'22« 3 0' Ease 700.0 f e e t , .ore
or l e s s
to the point where the City right-of-way changes d i r e c t i o n to Che Northeast.
t u ! ! ' „-.„,che srre-t rizht-of-way line continues Southeast to the East propertyA
l L f
£ c t ' ro " t y ; S i n e . South 60.0 feet to a point which i s North 337.96
f e t t and T „ C L , 0*7.67 feet from the West quarter Comer of Section 4 Township 44
South. Range 6 West. Salt Lake Base and Heridian; thence running Northwest to allow
\ To a foot s t r e e t right-of-way to intersect with a right-of-way line 10.0 feet
SoSth of the c i t y u c d l 7 easement; thence South 88' 22"50 ' West 700.0 feet; chence
Horthwe't to the Northeast 7 Corner of Lot 1423, Unit 6, Kanab Creek Ranchos Subdivision
which v ± l l create an easerneut for the excension of Navajo Drive i n an Easterly
direction to 'the public streec West of the Kanab /Lirporr.
T0CETQER VITE a l l improvements and Eppurtenances appertaining thereto, including ^ « Kunuo Sicy Hccct uiettL- and thrct City sewer hookups.

Df<L

ju^c^

^ * ~ i - ( -x>.yS- £-*'-"
7/
/

2>75"

/

'&C

c

SCHEDULE A
See copy of Deed attached
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Ref :„

Address p , O—Box 19321/ Lag V e g a s ,

NY—89132-0321

<§uit-(Elatm 5*ri>
JANET PACE PEREZ
, grantor,
County of
Clark
»Stateqfl&fy hereby
of
L a s Vegas
Nevada
QUIT-CLAIM to
the ATTICUS FAMILY TRUST, under Agreemeat dated September 15, 1992,
Janet Pace Perez and Roberta Jean Flournoy, Trustees
grantee,
of
for the sum of
DOLLARS,
the following described tract of land in
Kane
County,
State of Utah

c
c
c
c

Q

t
7Z

•* c

s

(See Exhibit A-attached)

o

ft

cc J

WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this
tAD

15 t h
, one thousand rune
hundred anu
and
neuuaarcu

day of
ninety-two. „
ninety-tWO
<^2^^

Signed in the presence of

Janet Pace Perez
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\^'3^
My CormnissKn Expires
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